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STATE V. CRUMPTON: HOW THE WASHINGTON STATE 
SUPREME COURT IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN 




Abstract: Post-conviction DNA testing is a valuable tool for ensuring innocent people are 
not wrongfully incarcerated. Society has strong interests in confirming that available, yet 
previously untested, DNA evidence matches the person convicted. Access to post-conviction 
DNA testing, however, has been limited to maintain finality and avoid an over-burdened 
court system. This Note examines post-conviction DNA testing in Washington State, 
particularly after the 2014 Washington State Supreme Court decision, State v. Crumpton. In 
Crumpton, a majority of the Court—over a strongly worded dissent—read a favorable 
presumption into Washington’s post-conviction DNA testing statute. The favorable 
presumption requires courts to presume the DNA test would be favorable to the petitioner, 
thus making it easier for convicted persons to access testing. Given the trend in other states, 
the astonishing number of exonerations, and the apparent falsity of the myth that DNA 
requests are over-burdening courts, Washington’s interest in justice supports expanding 
access to post-conviction DNA testing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are incarcerated, spending day after day in prison for a 
crime you did not commit. With each appeal, hope and fear fill your 
mind. Ronald Cotton felt this way when he learned, after spending 
eleven years in prison for a rape he did not commit, that a court granted 
his motion for post-conviction DNA testing.
1
 Ronald describes the 
period between the motion and the DNA results as a waiting game, a 
time filled with nightmares: 
I don’t know what I was more afraid of: the fact that this was my 
last shot at freedom and it could all backfire like it had before, or 
that it might work, and I would finally walk into the world 
again. . . . I didn’t know how much more my nerves could take. I 
resolved to put the case out of my mind. There was nothing 
more I could do now.
2
 
                                                     
* The author interned for a county prosecuting attorney’s office during law school. While there, 
she did not work on or learn of any matters relating to post-conviction DNA testing, or the statutes 
and cases cited herein. 
1. JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TORNEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR 
MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 175–76 (2009). 
2. Id. at 176–78. 
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On the other hand, imagine you were the victim of a horrendous 
crime; you are trying to heal, and build a life outside of the pain inflicted 
upon you. As each court date approaches, you anticipate closure, only to 
find out there will be more court dates in your future. Jennifer 
Thompson-Cannino, the victim in Ronald Cotton’s case, felt this way 
upon learning a court granted the man convicted of raping her post-
conviction DNA testing.
3
 Police asked Jennifer to give a sample of her 
blood for the laboratory to determine what DNA belonged to her and 
what belonged to her attacker.
4
 Jennifer described how this felt: 
I couldn’t believe how unfair it all was, that a twice-convicted 
rapist who was supposed to be sent away to die in prison could 
keep messing with my life. Weren’t the two trials enough? 
There was a part of me that wanted to say, “Screw it, his lawyers 
are going to have to come with a search warrant before they get 
a drop of my blood.” And this, I thought, looking out at our 
neatly mowed lawn and the tricycle parked by the garden, this is 
mine, and Ronald Cotton has no right to encroach on any of it. 
Still, the thought that this would go on any longer—that it would 
keep coming back into my life—was enough to make me agree. 
If this would finally make it go away, then I’d comply.
5
 
These two perspectives illustrate the high stakes of post-conviction 
review and the very real impact it can have on people’s lives. Although 
there are many different post-conviction review procedures and 
remedies, this Note focuses on post-conviction DNA testing. In 
particular, this Note analyzes the right to post-conviction DNA testing in 
Washington State under RCW 10.73.170, as the Washington State 
Supreme Court recently interpreted it in State v. Crumpton.
6
 
In State v. Crumpton, a jury convicted Lindsey Crumpton of five 
counts of first degree rape and one count of residential burglary.
7
 
Eighteen years after his conviction, Crumpton sought post-conviction 
relief under RCW 10.73.170, which permits those in prison for a felony 
to seek DNA testing of evidence.
8
 The trial court denied Crumpton’s 
motion, and the court of appeals affirmed this denial.
9
 After granting 
review, the Washington State Supreme Court held that in deciding 
                                                     
3. Id. at 194–96.  
4. Id. at 194–95. 
5. Id. at 195–96 (emphasis in original).  
6. 181 Wash. 2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014). 
7. Id. at 255–57, 332 P.3d at 449–50. 
8. Id. at 257, 332 P.3d at 450. 
9. Id. 
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whether to grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing, a court 
should presume the DNA test results would be favorable to the 
petitioner.
10
 Then, the court must determine if such favorable, 
exculpatory DNA results would demonstrate the petitioner’s innocence 
on a more probable than not basis.
11
 
This Note will examine the Crumpton decision and analyze why the 
Washington State Supreme Court was sharply divided. Part I will first 
explore the background of DNA testing and post-conviction DNA 
remedies under both Washington State and federal law. Part I will also 
discuss the Washington State Supreme Court cases on post-conviction 
DNA testing pre-Crumpton. Part II will detail the facts of Crumpton as 
well as the procedural background leading up to the Court’s decision. 
Part III will describe the legal analysis of both the majority and 
dissenting opinions, and explore how the justices’ analyses align with 
policy goals. Part IV will examine how intermediate appellate courts 
have applied Crumpton. Finally, Part V will evaluate the prudence of the 
favorable presumption established in Crumpton by comparing 
Washington State’s approach to DNA testing to the interpretations of 
DNA statutes in other states. 
I. UNDERSTANDING POST-CONVICTION DNA 
SCIENTIFICALLY AND LEGALLY 
To understand the Washington State Supreme Court’s holding in 
State v. Crumpton, this Note will first examine the scientific and legal 
background of post-conviction DNA testing. First, this Part will provide 
an overview of the science behind DNA testing, and how that science 
can be useful—and not useful—in the courtroom. Then, the statutory 
authority for post-conviction DNA testing in Washington State, as well 
as its federal counterpart, will be explored. Finally, this Part details the 
two primary Washington State Supreme Court decisions regarding post-
conviction DNA before Crumpton—State v. Riofta
12




                                                     
10. Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453.  
11. Id. 
12. 166 Wash. 2d 358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). 
13. 173 Wash. 2d 865, 271 P.3d 204 (2012). 
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A. Scientific and Legal Foundations of DNA Evidence Used in Post-
Conviction Review 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a blueprint of an individual’s genetic 
characteristics.
14
 DNA can be anywhere.
15
 The most commonly known 
sources of DNA evidence are blood, semen, hair, skin, and saliva; 
however, DNA can also be found on cigarette butts, bottles, clothing, or 
even a phone.
16
 A “DNA match” occurs when a reference sample is 
compared with evidence and the DNA profiles are the same.
17
 To make 
this comparison, first, a technician produces a DNA profile from a 
sample taken from the suspect—perhaps voluntarily or by court order.
18
 
Second, a technician produces a DNA profile from the biological 
evidence connected to the crime.
19
 Finally, the technician compares the 
two samples’ genotypes, and if there is a match, the technician 
determines the probability that a random person could have created the 
match.
20
 This process produces an objective probability that the suspect 
was the source of the biological evidence from the crime “to an 
extremely high degree of confidence.”
21
 
It is tempting to assume that a DNA match between a piece of 
evidence and a suspect is determinative of that suspect’s guilt.
22
 Both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys assign DNA evidence such “mythic 
infallibility” as a forensic technique.
23
 This myth has led to the idea that 
“DNA testing serves as a ‘truth machine’ that can definitively determine 
guilt or innocence beyond doubt.”
24
 But as the United States Supreme 
                                                     
14. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DNA FOR THE DEFENSE BAR 3 (2012); see 
also Aaron J. Lyttle, Return of the Repressed: Coping with Post-Conviction Innocence Claims in 
Wyoming, 14 WYO. L. REV. 555, 573 (2014) (“Nucleic acids (adenine, thymine, guanine, and 
cytosine) form nucleotide base pairs along a sugar phosphate backbone in a double spiral 
structure—called a double helix. This material, . . . (DNA), provides instructions for the functioning 
and development of living organisms.”). 
15. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 8. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 18. 
18. Lyttle, supra note 14, at 574. 
19. Id. at 575. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. 
22. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 1 (1999) (noting that DNA has become “the 
foremost forensic technique for identifying perpetrators, and eliminating suspects”).  
23. Jay D. Aronson, Certainty vs. Finality: Constitutional Rights to Postconviction DNA Testing, 
in REFRAMING RIGHTS 125, 133 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2011).  
24. Id.  
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Court has recognized, “DNA testing alone does not always resolve a 
case;” where there is an explanation for the DNA result and enough 
incriminating evidence, DNA science alone will not prove innocence.
25
 
The utility of DNA evidence is far more complicated. As articulated by 
the National Institute of Justice: 
When an individual is excluded as the potential source of DNA, 
it does not necessarily mean the individual was not involved. 
For example, a true perpetrator who left no detectable biological 
material will be excluded as a source of DNA. Conversely, if an 
individual is a potential source of DNA at a crime scene, it does 
not necessarily mean that person was involved in the crime.
26
 
Further, DNA tests do not always conclusively identify a particular 
person.
27
 There may be inconclusive or uninterpretable results due to 
complications such as multiple contributors, contamination, or 
degradation of samples.
28
 Complexities in DNA matching may increase 
more as scientific knowledge advances—for example, the increasing 
awareness of people with chimeric DNA.
29
 Given the complexities of 
DNA evidence, the dilemma has become “how to harness DNA’s power 
to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established 
system of criminal justice.”
30
 
DNA testing in criminal trials in the United States began in the mid-
1980s.
31
 Usually, a petitioner obtains post-conviction testing through 
application under the law of the state of the conviction.
32
 By the end of 
                                                     
25. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009). 
26. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 18. 
27. Id.; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 28–29. 
28. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 18; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 28–
29. 
29. Chimeric DNA arises when one person has two separate and distinct DNA strands in his 
body, which could result in a DNA sample taken from a buccal swab not matching a semen sample 
taken from the same person. Although beyond the scope of this Note, chimeric DNA could prove to 
further complicate the legal landscape of post-conviction DNA testing. See Catherine Arcabascio, 
Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and 
Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435 (2007) (exploring the current research on chimeric 
DNA, its potential interaction with the criminal justice system, and, briefly, how it could impact 
post-conviction DNA testing). 
30. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62.  
31. Christine E. White, Comment, Clearly Erroneous: The Court of Appeals of Maryland’s 
Misguided Shift to a Higher Standard for Post-Conviction DNA Relief, 71 MD. L. REV. 886, 889 
(2012) (citing Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62). 
32. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 158; see also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62 (noting that 
the task of harnessing “DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the 
established system of criminal justice” belongs to state legislatures).  
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2013, all fifty states had laws providing an avenue for post-conviction 
DNA testing,
33
 but these statutes vary widely from state to state.
34
 
According to the National Institute of Justice, “prosecutors frequently 
consent either to testing or to a motion under the statute, and courts 
routinely order testing on opposed motions under state statutes.”
35
 
Unfortunately, there is not an abundance of case law interpreting the 




Post-conviction DNA testing has had an incredible impact on the 
criminal justice system. There have been 330 DNA exonerations across 
the United States, and 140 actual perpetrators found as a result.
37
 DNA 
exonerations have provided insight into the fallibility of particular types 
of evidence and have opened the door for exonerations in all types of 
cases, not just those involving DNA.
38
 For example, a DNA exoneration 
could expose problems of eyewitness error or false confessions that are 
not limited to cases that have DNA evidence.
39
 Overall, there have been 
1650 exonerations across the United States, including DNA and non-
DNA cases.
40
 In Washington State, of the reported thirty-seven 
exonerations, four were the result of post-conviction DNA testing.
41
 If 
                                                     
33. John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a Constitutional 
Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New York in the 
Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1474 (2013). 
34. See Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of 
Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 799, 
811–22 (2011) (exploring the varying one-step, two-step, or three-step requirements for petitioners 
under different state statutes for post-conviction DNA testing); Lyttle, supra note 14, at 592–93 
(setting forth the approaches by New York and Illinois—which were at the forefront of adopting 
post-conviction DNA testing statutes—as well as the model legislation promulgated by the 
Innocence Project). 
35. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 158. 
36. Id. 
37.  INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
38.  Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 573, 574–75 (2004). 
39. Id.  
40. The National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, U. MICH. 
L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
41. The National Registry of Exonerations, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (on the “State” column heading, select “Washington” from the 
dropdown list) (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). For more information about the exonerations in 
Washington State, and to read the stories of the exonerees, see The Innocence Project Northwest, 
Our Clients’ Stories of Innocence, U. WASH. SCH. L., http://www.law.washington.edu/ 
Clinics/IPNW/stories.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). 
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not for post-conviction DNA testing, these four people would still be 
wrongfully incarcerated. Without post-conviction DNA testing, and the 
statutes that authorize it, people like Ronald Cotton
42
 would still be 
incarcerated despite their innocence, and the actual perpetrators would 
not have been identified. Thus, post-conviction DNA testing is an 
invaluable tool for ensuring justice in the criminal justice system. 
Because of the novelty of DNA statutes, however, there is limited case 
law interpreting them, and post-conviction DNA testing remains a 
critical area for research, judicial interpretation, and legislative action.
43
 
B. RCW 10.73.170: Washington Statutory Authority for Post-
Conviction DNA Testing 
As acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, the task of 
harnessing DNA’s power to prove innocence belongs to the 
legislatures.
44
 In Washington State, RCW 10.73.170 is the statutory 
authority for granting post-conviction DNA testing.
45
 In 2004, the 
previous Washington statute
46
 authorizing post-conviction DNA testing 
was set to expire, and the Washington legislature was on track to draft a 
new statute to replace it.
47
 However, due to time constraints, the 
                                                     
42. See supra notes 1–5. 
43. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000) (“A more 
commanding view awaits further study by legal scholars and journalists of all innocence cases.”). 
44. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (noting that the task of harnessing 
“DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of 
criminal justice” belongs to state legislatures). 
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014). 
46. Id. § 10.73.170(1)–(2) (2004) That version stated: 
 (1) On or before December 31, 2004, a person in this state who has been convicted of a 
felony and is currently serving a term of imprisonment and who has been denied 
postconviction DNA testing may submit a request to the state Office of Public Defense, which 
will transmit the request to the county prosecutor in the county where the conviction was 
obtained for postconviction DNA testing, if DNA evidence was not admitted because the court 
ruled DNA testing did not meet acceptable scientific standards or DNA testing technology was 
not sufficiently developed to test the DNA evidence in the case. On and after January 1, 2005, 
a person must raise the DNA issues at trial or on appeal.  
 (2) The prosecutor shall screen the request. The request shall be reviewed based upon the 
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not 
basis. The prosecutor shall inform the requestor and the state Office of Public Defense of the 
decision, and shall, in the case of an adverse decision, advise the requestor of appeals rights. 
Upon determining that testing should occur and the evidence still exists, the prosecutor shall 
request DNA testing by the Washington state patrol crime laboratory. Contact with victims 
shall be handled through victim/witness divisions. 
Id. 
47. H.R. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004). 
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legislature tabled it for the 2005 session.
48
 
The stated purpose of the proposed legislation was to “ensure that a 
process remains in place for cases where DNA tests could provide 
evidence of a person’s innocence.”
49
 The testimony in support of the bill, 
however, made clear that, “[b]y keeping the high ‘proof of innocence’ 
standard in the bill, the number of requests will remain low and testing 
will only be ordered in cases where there is a credible showing that it 
likely could benefit an innocent person.”
50
 
The current statute authorizing post-conviction DNA testing, in 
relevant part, reads: 
(1) A person convicted of a felony in a Washington state court 
who currently is serving a term of imprisonment may submit to 
the court that entered the judgment of conviction a verified 
written motion requesting DNA testing, with a copy of the 
motion provided to the state office of public defense. 
(2) The motion shall: 
(a) State that: 
(i) The court ruled that DNA testing did not meet 
acceptable scientific standards; or 
(ii) DNA testing technology was not sufficiently 
developed to test the DNA evidence in the case; or 
(iii) The DNA testing now requested would be 
significantly more accurate than prior DNA testing or 
would provide significant new information; 
(b) Explain why DNA evidence is material to the identity of 
the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to 
sentence enhancement, and 
(c) Comply with all other procedural requirements 
established by court rule. 
(3) The court shall grant a motion requesting DNA testing under 
this section if such motion is in the form required by subsection 
(2) of this section, and the convicted person has shown the 
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence 
on a more probable than not basis.
51
 
The substantive requirement of RCW 10.73.170(3)—the primary focus 
of this Note—is that a convicted person must show “the likelihood that 
the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable 
                                                     
48. H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005). 
49. H.R. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004). 
50. Id. 
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014). 
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C. 18 U.S.C. § 1300: Federal Statutory Authority for Post-Conviction 
DNA Testing and How It Has Been Judicially Interpreted 
In 2004, President Bush signed the Justice for All Act
53
 that, among 
its protections for crime victims, included the Innocence Protection Act 
of 2004.
54
 The Innocence Protection Act of 2004, in relevant part, reads: 
(a) In General – Upon a written motion by an individual under a 
sentence of imprisonment or death pursuant to a conviction for a 
Federal offense (referred to in this section as the “applicant”), 
the court that entered the judgment of conviction shall order 
DNA testing of specific evidence if the court finds that all of the 
following apply: (1) The applicant asserts, under penalty of 
perjury, that the applicant is actually innocent . . . .  
(6) The applicant identifies a theory of defense that— 
(A) is not inconsistent with an affirmative defense 
presented at trial; and 
(B) would establish the actual innocence of the 
applicant . . . . 
(8) The proposed DNA testing of the specific evidence may 
produce new material evidence that would— 
(A) support the theory of defense referenced in 
paragraph (6); and 
(B) raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did 
not commit the offense.
55
 
The Innocence Protection Act established the Kirk Bloodsworth
56
 
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Grant Program to award grants to states 
to help defray the costs of post-conviction DNA testing.
57
 Congress had 
three broad goals in establishing the Innocence Protection Act. At the 
forefront, Congress intended to protect crime victims’ rights.
58
 Congress 
also sought to improve the state of DNA analysis by eliminating the 
                                                     
52. Id. 
53. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) 
54. H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2012). 
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a). 
56. Kirk Bloodsworth was the first man in the United States sentenced to death but later cleared 
because of DNA evidence. STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN 15 (Carroll & Graf 1st ed. 2003). 
57. White, supra note 31, at 890 (citing Innocence Project Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 
Stat. 2284 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14136e (2004))). 
58. H.R. REP. NO. 108-711, at 1 (2004). 
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substantial backlog of DNA samples, improving and expanding DNA 
testing capacity at federal and state crime laboratories, increasing 
research and development of DNA testing technologies, and developing 
new training programs for the collection and use of DNA evidence.
59
 




Although Crumpton analyzed the Washington State post-conviction 
DNA testing statute,
61
 the state legislature modeled the Washington 
statute after the Innocence Protection Act.
62
 Thus, it is important to 
understand how the Washington and federal statutes differ. For example, 
the substantive requirements under the Washington statute require the 
petitioner to demonstrate “the likelihood that DNA evidence would 
demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis,”
63
 while, 
under the federal statute, the petitioner must demonstrate DNA testing 
would result in new material evidence that would raise a “reasonable 
probability” of innocence.
64
 Neither of the statutes explicitly call for a 
presumption that the DNA evidence would be favorable to the petitioner; 
however, courts have applied both statutes with a favorable 
presumption.
65
 Other approaches and the utility of explicit presumptions 
will be discussed in Part V.
66
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet issued a decision 
regarding the “reasonable probability” requirement found in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3600.
67
 However, various circuit courts have interpreted the statute as 
                                                     
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 258, 332 P.3d 448, 450 (2014) (citing WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.73.170 (2014)). 
62. Id. at 266, 332 P.3d at 454 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170. 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B) (2012). 
65. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 264, 332 P.3d at 453; infra note 68. 
66. See infra Part V.A. 
67. The Supreme Court of the United States, in evaluating a post-conviction DNA claim out of 
Alaska, has stated, “[a] criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same 
liberty interests as a free man.” Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009). 
Therefore, he no longer has a presumption of innocence. Id. at 69. Although many courts, including 
the Crumpton Court, cite Osborne in opinions regarding post-conviction DNA testing, see, e.g., 
Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 258, 332 P.3d at 450, the issues of Osborne were limited to the due 
process rights of post-conviction DNA testing by the states. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68–70. In holding 
that Alaska’s procedures were not inconsistent with any recognized principle of fairness, the Court 
did not further elaborate on the particular methods of review states should use or that which the 
federal statute requires. Id. And the “presumption of innocence” concerned post-conviction testing 
more broadly, which is distinct from the “favorable presumption” applied to DNA testing results. 
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requiring a favorable presumption—even though there is no favorable 
presumption written into the statute—when reviewing district court 
decisions on post-conviction DNA testing motions.
68
 For example, in 
United States v. Fields,
69
 the Fifth Circuit quoted the district court’s 
reasoning in denying the petitioner’s motion: “even assuming that the 
outcome of any DNA test would be favorable to [petitioner], he has not 
established that such outcome would raise a reasonable probability of his 
actual innocence” given the compelling evidence of his guilt presented at 
trial.
70
 Therefore, although the reviewing court affirmed the denial of the 
motion, the court evaluated the motion assuming a favorable result. 
In drafting RCW 10.73.170, the Washington State House of 
Representatives recognized that in order to receive federal funding to 
further its goals of innocence protection, the bill needed to meet federal 
standards, and drafted it to do so.
71
 The Washington State Supreme 
Court has recognized the conformance of RCW 10.73.170 with the 
Innocence Protection Act.
72
 Like RCW 10.73.170, there is no explicit 
favorable presumption in the Innocence Protection Act.
73
 
D. Previous Decisions by the Washington State Supreme Court 
Interpreting the State’s Post-Conviction Relief Statute 
The leading case out of the Washington State Supreme Court 
interpreting RCW 10.73.170 is State v. Riofta.
74
 The Court, in an opinion 
authored by Chief Justice Madsen, held that a trial court is required to 
grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing when favorable results 
would raise a reasonable probability that the petitioner was not the one 
                                                     
68. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 597 F. App’x 882 (7th Cir. 2015) (even presuming the 
absence of petitioner’s DNA on tested materials, such testing would not disprove his involvement in 
the drug conspiracy); United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014) (assuming a favorable 
DNA result); United States v. Pitera, 675 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2012) (even absence of DNA on tested 
gun would not raise a reasonable probability of innocence); United States v. Jordan, 594 F.3d 1265 
(10th Cir. 2010) (favorable DNA result is not inconsistent with the government’s theory of the case 
such that it calls into question his guilt); United States v. Fasano, 577 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009) (if 
testing does not find petitioner’s DNA, the government’s strong case evaporates and a reasonable 
probability of innocence is shown). 
69. 761 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014). 
70. Fields, 761 F.3d at 479–80 (emphasis added). 
71. H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2005) (“In order to receive a portion of that 
initiative funding, state law must conform with federal law. This bill as drafted meets those 
standards.”). 
72. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 266, 332 P.3d 448, 454 (2014). 
73. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(A)–(B) (2012), with Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 266, 332 
P.3d at 454. 
74. 166 Wash. 2d 358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). 
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who committed the crime.
75
 Riofta involved a gang-related shooting, 
where the shooter dropped a white hat on the sidewalk as he fled the 
scene.
76
 The victim had known Riofta for several years prior to the 
shooting, identified him when police arrived, and subsequently picked 
him from a photo montage.
77
 After his conviction for first degree assault 
with a firearm, Riofta sought DNA testing of the white hat without 
success.
78
 The trial court’s denial was affirmed by the court of appeals.
79
 
In reviewing the denial of his motion for post-conviction DNA 
testing, the Washington State Supreme Court began by analyzing the 
procedural requirement of RCW 10.73.170.
80
 The Court stated the 
statute “provides a means for a convicted person to produce DNA 
evidence that the original fact finder did not consider,” for whatever 
reason.
81
 Thus, even though the white hat at issue in Riofta was available 
for testing at trial, DNA testing was not precluded by the procedural 
requirement of RCW 10.73.170 on that basis because the hat had not 
actually been tested at trial.
82
 
The Court went on to analyze the substantive requirement of RCW 
10.73.170.
83
 First, the Court recognized—as had been pointed out by the 
court of appeals—that because more than one person could have worn 
the hat, DNA test results excluding Riofta “would not show the 
likelihood that he would demonstrate his innocence.”
84
 The Court went 
on to say, “a court must look to whether, viewed in light of all of the 
evidence presented at trial or newly discovered, favorable DNA test 
results would raise the likelihood that the person is innocent on a more 
probable than not basis.”
85
 Put differently, under the statute, a trial court 
is required to “grant a motion for postconviction testing when 
exculpatory results would, in combination with other evidence, raise a 
reasonable probability the petitioner was not the perpetrator.”
86
 The 
Court also reiterated that petitioners seeking post-conviction relief face a 
                                                     
75. See id. at 373, 209 P.3d at 475. 
76. Id. at 362, 209 P.3d at 469–70. 
77. Id. at 362–63, 209 P.3d at 470. 
78. Id. at 363, 209 P.3d at 470. 
79. Id. at 364, 209 P.3d at 470. 
80. Id. at 365–66, 209 P.3d at 471. 
81. Id. at 366, 209 P.3d at 471. 
82. Id. at 366, 209 P.3d at 472. 
83. Id. at 367, 209 P.3d at 472. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (emphasis added). 
86. Id. at 367–68, 209 P.3d at 472 (emphasis in original). 
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After Riofta, the Washington State Supreme Court addressed the 
denial of a motion under RCW 10.73.170 in State v. Thompson.
88
 
Thompson involved the rape and beating of a woman at a hotel.
89
 The 
victim met a man at a bar who invited her to an after-hours party at a 
nearby hotel.
90
 The victim went to the man’s hotel room but soon 
realized that no one else was present.
91
 She then attempted to leave, but 
the perpetrator would not let her escape and began to brutally beat, rape, 
and attempt to strangle and drown her, causing her to lose consciousness 
many times.
92
 Responding police saw Thompson push the victim out of 
the room where the rape occurred, and police arrested Thompson on the 
scene.
93
 The victim suffered from memory problems due to the trauma, 
and reported her attacker “might have had blond hair, did not have facial 
hair, and was between 5’7” and 5’8” tall.”
94
 A jury found Thompson 
guilty of first degree rape, and nine years later a court denied his motion 
for post-conviction DNA testing.
95
 
The Court in Thompson was primarily concerned with whether 
evidence not admitted at trial could be used in a post-conviction DNA 
testing motion.
96
 In Thompson’s case, the evidence was a statement 
made by Thompson to arresting officers.
97
 The Court held the trial court 
improperly relied on the unadmitted statement when denying testing.
98
 
However, the Court also considered whether Thompson had met the 
requisite substantive burden in his motion.
99
 
In Thompson, the Court embraced the standard from Riofta, noting the 
“statute requires a trial court to grant a motion for postconviction testing 
                                                     
87. Id. at 369, 209 P.3d at 473 (“[D]efendants seeking postconviction relief face a heavy burden 
and are in a significantly different situation that a person facing trial.”). 
88. 173 Wash. 2d 865, 271 P.3d 204 (2012). 
89. Id. at 867, 271 P.3d at 205. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 867–68, 271 P.3d at 205. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 868, 271 P.3d at 205. 
94. Id. at 869, 271 P.3d at 205. 
95. Id. at 869, 271 P.3d at 206. 
96. Id. at 872–73, 271 P.3d at 207. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 876, 271 P.3d at 209. 
99. Id. at 874–76, 271 P.3d at 208–09. The Court only considered the limited issue of whether the 
trial court erred when it considered evidence available to the State at the time of trial but not 
admitted at trial. Therefore, the Court did not discuss the procedural burden Thompson had under 
RCW 10.73.170. Id. at 871, 271 P.3d at 206–07. 
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when exculpatory results would, in combination with the other evidence, 
raise a reasonable probability the petitioner was not the perpetrator.”
100
 
Emphasizing that there was only one perpetrator, the Court stated, “[i]f 
DNA test results should conclusively exclude Thompson as the source of 
the collected semen, it is more probable than not that his innocence 
would be established, particularly in light of the weakness of the victim’s 
identification of Thompson as her attacker.”
101
 Ultimately, the Court 
agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court should have granted 
Thompson’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing.
102
 Riofta and 
Thompson set the stage for the Washington State Supreme Court to 
decide Crumpton and the fate of post-conviction DNA testing in 
Washington State. 
II. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURE OF CRUMPTON BEFORE 
THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 
On April 10, 1993, D.E. awoke at 3:15 AM to a man standing in her 
room.
103
 The man attacked D.E., pulled her clothing off, and covered her 
head with pillows before raping her anally.
104
 The man raped D.E. five 
times that night, rummaging through other rooms in her house between 
each rape.
105
 After the last attack, the perpetrator rammed handkerchiefs 
from a nightstand inside D.E., poured something cold on her, and 
washed her.
106
 After the man fled, D.E. went to a neighbor’s house and 
they called 911 around 5:15 AM.
107
 Because the attacker covered her 
head during the attack, the only description D.E. could give of the man 




At 5:23 AM, a responding officer noticed a heavy-set black man 
running a half a mile from D.E.’s home.
109
 This man was Lindsey 
                                                     
100. Id. at 874, 271 P.3d at 208 (quoting State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 367–68, 209 P.3d 
467, 472 (2009)). 
101. Id. at 875, 271 P.3d at 208 (emphasis added). 
102. Id. at 876, 271 P.3d at 209. 
103. State v. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. 408, 410, 289 P.3d 766, 767 (2012). 
104. Id. 
105. Id.  
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 411, 289 P.3d at 767. 
108. Id. at 410–11, 289 P.3d at 767 (quoting State v. Crumpton, No. 17502-9-II, 1996 WL 
1083334 (Wash. Ct. App. June 14, 1996), review denied, 130 Wash. 2d 1018, 928 P.2d 415 (1996)). 
109. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 256, 332 P.3d 448, 449 (2014). 
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 The officer described the man’s skin as “wet looking,” said 
he smelled of cologne, and stated he was carrying a piece of flowered 
print bedding that appeared to have blood smears on it.
111
 In a search 
incident to Crumpton’s arrest, officers found the following on his 
person: a large quantity of women’s jewelry, a cigarette case, a ring 
case, three soiled and oily white handkerchiefs, a flannel sheet, and a 
telephone cord.
112
 Crumpton told officers he had just left his sister’s 
house and was on the way to his mother’s house.
113
 Crumpton admitted 
to being in D.E.’s house, but he denied raping D.E.
114
 
The investigation at D.E.’s house revealed the front door forced open 
and the bedroom in “complete disarray.”
115
 In the hallway, a telephone 
cord was cut.
116
 A bottle of Crisco oil and a soaked handkerchief with a 
“reddish stain” were found in D.E.’s bedroom.
117
 The oil caused any 
fingerprints found to have no usable value.
118
 The sheet found on 
Crumpton matched the sheet on D.E.’s bed, and D.E. identified the 
jewelry, cigarette case, handkerchiefs, and other items as hers.
119
 
Investigators discovered sperm on the rectal swab of D.E. and on her 
sheets.
120
 In addition, investigators collected hairs from D.E.’s bedroom, 




The State charged Crumpton with five counts of first degree rape and 
one count of residential burglary.
122
 The jury found him guilty as 
charged.
123
 The judge sentenced Crumpton to an exceptional sentence 
                                                     
110. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. at 411, 289 P.3d at 768. 
111. Id. at 411, 289 P.3d at 768 (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334). 
112. Id. at 411–12, 289 P.3d at 768. 
113. Id. at 412, 289 P.3d at 768. 
114. Id. at 420, 289 P.3d at 772. 
115. Id. at 412, 289 P.3d at 768 (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334). 
118. Id.  
119. Id.  
120. Id. The items were not tested for DNA for the trial.  
121. Id. at 413, 289 P.3d at 768 (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334). Although beyond the 
scope of this Note, it should be acknowledged that hair microscopy evidence has been criticized as 
unreliable. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, “Good” Science Gone Bad: How 
the Criminal Justice System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 
1007 (2008) (raising concerns of the lack of peer review, no proficiency testing, high error rates, 
and simple “eyeballing” that occurs with hair microscopy evidence). 
122. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 257, 332 P.3d 448, 450 (2014). 
123. Id.  
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based on deliberate cruelty and particular vulnerability of the victim.
124
 
Crumpton appealed, the court of appeals affirmed his conviction, and the 
Washington State Supreme Court denied review.
125
 
Eighteen years after his conviction, Crumpton petitioned for post-
conviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170 of the following: items 
from the victim’s rape kit, a flannel sheet, two white handkerchiefs, and 
hairs collected at the scene of the crime.
126
 The trial court denied 
Crumpton’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing under RCW 
10.73.170, finding that Crumpton had failed to show a reasonable 
probability of his innocence.
127
 Crumpton appealed to Division II of the 
Washington State Court of Appeals.
128
 
The court of appeals subsequently issued a published opinion
129
 in 
which it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Crumpton’s post-conviction request for DNA testing under RCW 
10.73.170.
130
 After articulating the abuse of discretion standard of 
review,
131
 the court relied on Riofta’s interpretation of RCW 10.73.170 
to affirm the trial court.
132
 Interpreting Riofta, the court of appeals 
explained that when reviewing motions for post-conviction DNA testing, 
the lower courts must consider whether, in light of all other evidence 
presented at trial, favorable DNA results would demonstrate the 
petitioner’s innocence on a more probable than not basis.
133
 Thus, the 
court of appeals acknowledged the standard for reviewing such motions 
is to presume favorable DNA results. 
Despite its application of the favorable presumption, the court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Crumpton’s motion.
134
 The 
court agreed with the State that, when combined with other evidence, a 
DNA test in this case would simply not raise an inference of 
innocence.
135
 The court then weighed the various evidence presented at 
                                                     
124. Id. 
125. Id.  
126.  Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. at 413, 289 P.3d at 769. 
127. Id. at 414, 289 P.3d at 769. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 408, 289 P.3d at 766. 
130. Id. at 410, 289 P.3d at 767. 
131. Id. at 416, 289 P.3d at 770 (citing State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 370, 209 P.3d 467, 473 
(2009)). 
132. Id. at 418, 289 P.3d at 771 (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 367, 209 P.3d at 472 (citing 
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(3) (2014))). 
133. Id. (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 367, 209 P.3d at 472). 
134. Id. at 410, 289 P.3d at 767. 
135. Id. at 419, 289 P.3d at 772. 
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trial—including Crumpton’s presence near the home, his possession of 
the victim’s belongings, and his admission to being in the home—
against the possibility of a favorable DNA test.
136
 The court found even 
exculpatory DNA results would not exonerate Crumpton; “[i]n short, 
DNA testing here would not likely change the outcome.”
137
 
However, the three-judge panel was split two to one.
138
 The dissent 
and majority agreed the rule for evaluating the motion was whether, 
viewed in light of all evidence presented at trial, favorable DNA results 
would raise a likelihood of innocence.
139
 But the dissent argued the 
majority misapplied the rule by “basing its decision on the strength of 
the evidence presented at trial and its conclusion that DNA evidence is 
unlikely to help Crumpton.”
140
 Under the dissent’s approach, one must 
not look at the strength of the evidence of guilt, for the evidence will 
always be strong because a jury has already found the convicted person 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
141
 Rather, the court must look to see 
how the evidence stands up in the presence of a favorable DNA test 
result.
142
 Crumpton sought review from the Washington State Supreme 
Court, and the Court granted review in June of 2013.
143
 
III. STATE V. CRUMPTON: THE WASHINGTON STATE 
SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A. Justice Fairhurst’s Majority Opinion: Reading a Favorable 
Presumption into the Statute to Allow Petitioners Access to Post-
Conviction DNA Testing 
The Washington State Supreme Court announced State v. Crumpton 
on August 21, 2014.
144
 Justice Fairhurst authored the opinion, with 
Justices Johnson, Wiggins, González, Gordon McCloud, and Dwyer 
concurring.
145
 Justice Stephens filed a dissenting opinion, with Justice 
Owens and Chief Justice Madsen concurring.
146
 As characterized by the 
                                                     
136. Id. at 419–20, 289 P.3d at 772. 
137. Id. at 420, 289 P.3d at 772. 
138. See generally id. 
139. Id. at 422, 289 P.3d at 773 (Worswick, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. (citing State v. Gray, 151 Wash. App. 762, 773, 215 P.3d 961 (2009)). 
142. Id. (emphasis added). 
143. State v. Crumpton, 177 Wash. 2d 1015, 306 P.3d 960 (2013) (order granting review). 
144. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014). 
145. Id. at 255–64, 332 P.3d at 449–53. 
146. Id. at 264–71, 332 P.3d at 453–57. 
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majority, the issue facing the Court was, “the standard the court should 
use to decide a motion for postconviction DNA testing and whether a 
court should presume DNA evidence would be favorable to the 
convicted individual when determining if it is likely the evidence would 
prove his or her innocence.”
147
 
After acknowledging the statute has procedural and substantive 
components, and that the State conceded Crumpton met his procedural 
burden, the Court began exploring the substantive portion of RCW 
10.73.170.
148
 Crumpton argued the trial court should presume the DNA 
results would be favorable in deciding whether to grant his motion for 
post-conviction DNA testing.
149
 The State, on the other hand, argued 
Crumpton must show the DNA evidence would demonstrate his 
innocence on a more probable than not basis in light of all the other 
evidence presented at trial to obtain testing.
150
 
Before reaching its holding, the Court examined the statutory 
requirements of RCW 10.73.170, the case law interpreting RCW 
10.73.170, and the policy considerations supporting a finding of a 
favorable presumption.
151
 The majority read a favorable presumption—
presuming a DNA test would be favorable to the petitioner—into RCW 
10.73.170, thus expanding a petitioner’s right to post-conviction DNA 
testing.
152
 The Court further recognized, “[w]hile the text of RCW 
10.73.170(3) does not specifically mention a favorable presumption, 
cases applying this statute and the substantive standard therein have 
discussed the favorable results.”
153
 
The first case the Court discussed was State v. Riofta.
154
 The Court 
emphasized that in Riofta the Court applied the facts by looking at each 
of the two possible favorable outcomes for Riofta: the absence of 
Riofta’s DNA or the presence of another person’s DNA.
155
 However, 
because neither favorable result made Riofta’s innocence more or less 
                                                     
147. Id. at 255, 332 P.3d at 449. 
148. Id. at 258–59, 332 P.3d at 450–51 (exploring the requirement that the person show “the 
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis” 
(citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(2) (2014))). 
149. Id. at 258, 332 P.3d at 449. 
150. Id. at 258–59, 332 P.3d at 450–51. 
151. Id. at 259–63, 332 P.3d at 451–53. 
152. Id. at 260, 332 P.3d at 452. 
153. Id. at 259, 332 P.3d at 451. 
154. Id.; State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). 
155. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 259–60, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 370, 
209 P.3d at 473–74). 
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likely, the Court denied the testing.
156
 The majority concluded, “[t]he 
Riofta court recognized that a court should assess the impact of an 
exculpatory DNA test in light of all the evidence from trial when 
deciding a motion for postconviction DNA [testing].”
157
 Therefore, 




Next, the Court analyzed State v. Thompson.
159
 The majority focused 
on the language in Thompson that discussed how any DNA evidence that 
excluded him as a possible source would show Thompson’s innocence 
on a more probable than not basis because it was a single perpetrator 
rape case.
160
 The majority went on to conclude, “[l]ike the court in 
Riofta, the Thompson court presumed the evidence would be favorable 
to the convicted party to decide the motion.”
161
 
The last case the Court analyzed in Crumpton was a court of appeals 
decision, State v. Gray.
162
 Gray involved a single perpetrator rape and 
attempted rape of two teenage girls that were camping with friends.
163
 
The Crumpton Court explained, “[t]he [court of appeals] concluded that 
if some of the evidence Gray requested be tested came back as not his 
DNA, it would be material to his innocence and therefore the motion for 
postconviction testing should be granted.”
164
 The Court went on to say 
that Gray also recognized, “[i]f only one person committed the crime, 
then the presence of other DNA would suggest innocence on a more 
probable than not basis.”
165
 
                                                     
156. Id. (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 370, 209 P.3d at 474–75). 
157. Id. at 259–60, 332 P.3d at 451 (emphasis in original) (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 369, 
209 P.3d at 473). 
158. See id. 
159. Id. at 260, 332 P.3d at 451; State v. Thompson, 173 Wash. 2d 865, 271 P.3d 204 (2012). 
160. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 260, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Thompson, 173 Wash. 2d at 875, 
271 P.3d at 208). 
161. Id. (citing Thompson, 173 Wash. 2d at 875, 271 P.3d at 208). 
162. Id.; State v. Gray, 151 Wash. App. 762, 215 P.3d 961 (2009). 
163. Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 765, 215 P.3d at 963. 
164. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 260, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 774, 215 
P.3d at 967). It should be noted that there were various pieces of evidence requested for testing in 
Gray. Therefore, the court’s analysis of whether exculpatory DNA results would demonstrate 
Gray’s innocence considered the various pieces of evidence and how they fit together, rather than 
just one piece of evidence that may not alone be dispositive of Gray’s innocence. For example, the 
court said, “if testing revealed a matching DNA profile from the swabs taken from C.S., and from 
R.J.’s clothing or hair taken from her clothing, this evidence would be clearly material to the 
identity of the perpetrator.” Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 772, 215 P.3d at 966. 
165. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 260, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 774, 215 
P.3d at 967). 
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The Court found Thompson and Gray were factually analogous to 
Crumpton.
166
 According to the Court, “[e]ach case involved weak 
identification evidence but otherwise had very strong physical and 
circumstantial evidence tying the convicted individual to the crime.”
167
 
The majority also focused on the cases having only a single 
perpetrator.
168
 Single perpetrator cases are particularly important 
because if there is only one possible DNA source, testing of that DNA 
would bear heavily on a person’s guilt or innocence.
169
 As the Court 
explained, “[a]ny DNA evidence left on the items Crumpton petitioned 
to test would almost certainly have been left by the perpetrator of the 
rape. Exculpatory results of DNA testing in this case would directly 
affect the likelihood Crumpton was innocent.”
170
 Therefore, the Court 
concluded, as the courts in Thompson and Gray had done, it too must 




The Court reaffirmed Riofta’s conclusion that the legislature intended 
the substantive requirement in the statute to be “onerous.”
172
 The Court 
recognized the important balance between the opportunities for 
exonerations with DNA testing and the potential that laboratories will be 
overburdened and state resources wasted by frivolous requests.
173
 
However, the majority described reading a favorable presumption into 
RCW 10.73.170 as “the appropriate analytical method for achieving the 
most just resolution to these motions.”
174
 The Court aimed to create a 
standard that is “onerous but reasonable enough to let legitimate claims 
survive.”
175
 The Court further cautioned against focusing on the 
overwhelming physical and circumstantial evidence against Crumpton, 
because there will always be strong evidence against a convicted 




                                                     






172. Id. (citing State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467, 472 (2009)). Although the 
Court in Crumpton does not define “onerous,” Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[e]xcessively 
burdensome or troublesome; causing hardship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (9th ed. 2009). 
173. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 261–62, 332 P.3d at 452. 
174. Id. at 261, 332 P.3d at 452.  
175. Id. at 262, 332 P.3d at 452. 
176. Id. 
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The Court ultimately held: 
Case law supports using a favorable presumption when deciding 
whether to grant a motion for postconviction DNA testing. We 
formally hold that this presumption is part of the standard in 
RCW 10.73.170. A court should look to whether, considering all 
the evidence from trial and assuming an exculpatory DNA test 
result, it is likely the individual is innocent on a more probable 
than not basis. If so, the court should grant the motion and allow 
testing to be done. Only then can it be determined whether the 
DNA actually exculpates the individual and if the results could 
be used to support a motion for a new trial.
177
 
Because the majority found there was no indication the trial court had 
applied the favorable presumption, they found the trial court abused its 
discretion.
178
 Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial 
court to apply the proper standard in reviewing Crumpton’s motion for 
post-conviction DNA testing.
179
 The Court also dictated the result: 
“[u]sing this presumption Crumpton’s motion must be granted.”
180
 
B. Justice Stephens’s Dissenting Opinion: Focusing on Legislative 
Intent to Limit Post-Conviction DNA Testing 
Justice Stephens authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justice 
Owens and Chief Justice Madsen.
181
 The dissent concluded that 
Crumpton’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing should have been 
denied because he did not meet his statutory burden, the plain language 
and legislative intent of RCW 10.73.170 did not support a favorable 




First, the dissent looked to the language of the statute, which does not 
contain an explicit “favorable presumption.”
183
 The substantive 
requirement of the statute provides the petitioner must show “the 
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a 
more probable than not basis.”
184
 Further, the federal statute, which 
                                                     
177. Id. at 261–62, 332 P.3d at 451–52. 
178. Id. at 263–64, 332 P.3d at 453.  
179. Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453. 
180. Id. at 261, 332 P.3d at 452.  
181. Id. at 264, 271, 332 P.3d at 453, 457 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 271, 332 P.3d at 456–57. 
183. Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453.  
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(2) (2014). 
11 - McCrite.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:50 PM 
1416 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1395 
 
Justice Stephens characterized as the “driving force” behind RCW 
10.73.170, contains no explicit favorable presumption.
185
 Justice 
Stephens noted, “[a]s is the case with the Washington statute, the burden 
under the federal statute is heavy. A petitioner who has already been 
convicted does not enjoy the same liberties as existed prior to trial; the 
‘presumption of innocence disappears.’”
186
 
Second, the dissent addressed the statute’s legislative history.
187
 At 
the forefront, the dissent recognized the delicate balance the legislature 
sought between “society’s interest in justice with its interest in finality” 
in matters that have already been decided by a jury.
188
 The balance 
struck placed a high burden—an onerous standard—on obtaining post-
conviction DNA testing.
189
 “As the legislature explained, ‘[b]y keeping 
the high “proof of innocence” standard in the bill, the number of 
requests will remain low and testing will only be ordered in cases where 
there is a credible showing that it likely could benefit an innocent 
person.’”
190
 To the dissent, the legislative history was evidence that “the 




Third, the dissent expressed concern about how the statute, read with 
the favorable presumption, would apply in single perpetrator rape 
cases.
192
 The dissent argued that a favorable presumption eliminates the 
onerous statutory burden under RCW 10.73.170 because a petitioner 
“must present a theory of innocence and not simply contend, ‘I didn’t do 
it’” to meet the rigorous statutory standard.
193
 According to the dissent, 
                                                     
185. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 266, 332 P.3d at 454; see 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2012).  
186. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 266, 332 P.3d at 454 (quoting Dist. Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68–69 (2009)). It must be noted that the “presumption of innocence” and the 
“favorable presumption” for DNA testing are very different. The “presumption of innocence” 
language is used by Justice Stephens here to explain why federal courts have applied a “heavy 
burden” for relief under the federal statute, not to equate the standards. See id.  
187. Id. at 265–66, 332 P.3d at 454. 
188. Id. at 265, 332 P.3d at 454. 
189. Id.  
190. Id. at 265–66, 332 P.3d at 454 (alteration in original) (quoting H.B. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. 
Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2004)). 
191. Id. at 266, 332 P.3d at 454. Notably, Chief Justice Madsen wrote the majority opinion in 
Riofta, the case relied on most heavily by the Court in Crumpton. Although the Chief Justice did not 
write a dissenting opinion in Crumpton to illuminate her exact reasoning, it is difficult to reconcile 
the majority’s analysis of Riofta with her dissenting vote in Crumpton. If interpreting Riofta 
necessitates finding a favorable presumption in RCW 10.73.170, as the majority characterized, then 
it is surprising that the justice who wrote that opinion seems to disagree with that interpretation. 
192. Id. at 267, 332 P.3d at 455.  
193. Id. 
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Crumpton rested his motion on nothing more than the contention that, 
because this is a single perpetrator rape case, DNA evidence would 
prove his innocence; Crumpton did not advance any new theory of 




Justice Stephens also argued that policy considerations supported not 
reading a favorable presumption into RCW 10.73.170 because of the 
impact of the presumption in single perpetrator cases.
195
 The favorable 
presumption may be seen as taking discretion away from the trial courts 
in single perpetrator cases to consider each possible DNA testing 
result—whether favorable, inconclusive, or negative.
196
 As the dissent 
said, the legislature “vested discretion in the trial court to consider the 
evidence at trial in conjunction with any new evidence and the 
possibility of favorable DNA results . . . . [C]onclusively applying a 
favorable presumption practically eliminates the trial court’s discretion 
in a single perpetrator rape case.”
197
 
Fourth, the dissent distinguished the cases that guided the majority’s 
analysis.
198
 Beginning with Riofta, the dissent took issue with the 
majority’s characterization of the issue presented.
199
 The court of 
appeals holding that caused concern in Riofta was that a petitioner must 
demonstrate his innocence based on the DNA test results alone.
200
 
According to the dissent, the Court in Riofta never considered whether 
RCW 10.73.170 required a favorable presumption, and nothing in Riofta 
“supports a reading of the statute that would allow the petitioner in a 




The dissent also found Thompson was not factually analogous to 
Crumpton because of the weak identification of the attacker by the 
victim.
202
 The victim in Thompson did not get a good look at the 
perpetrator, she lost consciousness several times, had lapses in memory, 
and there was a lack of corroborating evidence, such as injuries on 
                                                     
194. Id. at 268, 332 P.3d at 455.  
195. Id. at 267–68, 332 P.3d at 455. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 267, 332 P.3d at 455.  
198. Id. at 268–71, 332 P.3d at 455–56. 
199. Id. at 269, 332 P.3d at 455. 
200. Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453 (citing State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467, 472 
(2009)). 
201. Id. at 269, 332 P.3d at 456. 
202. Id. at 270, 332 P.3d at 456.  
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 The facts in Crumpton, as the dissent described, were “not 
nearly as precarious” because Crumpton admitted to being in the house, 
police found him nearby, he had the victim’s possessions on him, and 




Finally, the dissent expressed concern that shifting the focus away 
from whether the petitioner had shown innocence on a more probable 
than not basis may “create a revolving door for individuals already 
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt to postpone finality and burden the 
system with requests for DNA testing solely on the ground that new 
DNA technology now exists.”
205
 In conclusion, the dissent reasoned, 
“[r]ather than reading a favorable presumption into the language of 
RCW 10.73.170, we should require the petitioner to show what the 
statute’s plain language demands—a ‘likelihood that the DNA evidence 
would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis.’”
206
 
The dissent stated Crumpton did not meet this evidentiary burden; 




IV. HOW CRUMPTON HAS BEEN APPLIED: INTERMEDIATE 
APPELLATE COURTS HAVE APPLIED CRUMPTON’S 
FAVORABLE PRESUMPTION TO AFFIRM DENIALS OF 
MOTIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING 
There has been little judicial application of Crumpton’s favorable 
presumption in the months since its enactment. As of this writing, there 
have been three unpublished intermediate appellate decisions citing 
Crumpton.
208
 In these cases, the courts applied a favorable presumption 




The first case, decided by a three judge panel in Division III of the 
                                                     
203. Id.  
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 268, 332 P.3d at 455. 
206. Id. at 271, 332 P.3d at 457 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014)). 
207. Id. at 268, 332 P.3d at 455. 
208. See State v. Allen, No. 31578-9-III, 2014 WL 5089235 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2014); State 
v. Tovar, No. 70721–3–I, 2015 WL 540903 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015); State v. Jones, No. 
32182–7–III, 2015 WL 3618633 (Wash. Ct. App. June 9, 2015). Jones will not be discussed further 
because Jones’s motion was denied because no DNA evidence was ever collected. Jones, 2015 WL 
3618633, at *1. Therefore, there was no evidence available for post-conviction testing.  
209. See Allen, 2014 WL 5089235; Tovar, 2015 WL 540903. 
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Washington State Court of Appeals, is State v. Allen.
210
 In that case, a 
jury convicted Anthony Allen of kidnapping and assault.
211
 Allen filed a 
motion for post-conviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170, and the 
superior court denied his motion.
212
 The court of appeals affirmed the 
trial court, holding that “[a]lthough DNA testing serves a worthwhile 
purpose, its employment is not helpful here, since the victims of the 
crimes were acquaintances of Anthony Allen and would not misidentify 
him. Thus, the statutory basis to compel DNA testing is not satisfied.”
213
 
The court in Allen specifically stated that Riofta controlled its 
decision.
214
 The opinion cites Crumpton when detailing the factual 
background of post-conviction DNA testing cases in Washington.
215
 
After applying the standard set forth in Riofta, the court in Allen simply 
said, “[c]ase law supports using a favorable presumption when deciding 
whether to grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing.”
216
 The 
court did not cite to Crumpton for this proposition; in fact, there was no 
citation at all.
217
 However, the recognition of a favorable presumption 




The second case, decided by a three judge panel in Division I of the 
Washington State Court of Appeals, is State v. Tovar.
219
 In that case, a 
jury had convicted Michael Tovar of second degree rape while armed 
with a deadly weapon.
220
 Tovar’s argument in support of post-conviction 
DNA testing was that a favorable DNA result would demonstrate the 
victim had lied when she testified she was monogamous with Tovar; 
therefore, she was not a credible witness against him.
221
 Tovar’s defense 
                                                     
210. See Allen, 2014 WL 5089235.  
211. Id. at *1. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at *4. Allen is factually analogous to Riofta as they both involve an object which could 
have been readily used by multiple people, therefore it could have multiple DNA sources. In Allen 
the evidence in question was a kitchen knife, whereas in Riofta the evidence was a baseball hat. Id. 
at *4; State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 362, 209 P.3d 467, 469–70 (2009). 
215. Allen, 2014 WL 5089235, at *4. 
216. Id. at *3. 
217. Id. 
218. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 260, 332 P.3d 448, 452 (2014) (holding that “[a] 
court should look to whether, considering all the evidence from trial and assuming an exculpatory 
DNA test result, it is likely the individual is innocent on a more probable than not basis”). 
219. No. 70721–3–I, 2015 WL 540903 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015).  
220. Id. at *1. 
221. Id. 
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at trial was consent.
222
 The superior court denied Tovar’s motion for 
post-conviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170,
223
 and the court of 
appeals affirmed the denial because a favorable DNA test “would not 
raise a reasonable probability of Tovar’s innocence.”
224
 
The court in Tovar, unlike the court in Allen, specifically relied on 
Crumpton in reaching its decision. The court stated that “[w]hen 
determining if it is likely the DNA evidence would demonstrate 
innocence, ‘a court should presume DNA evidence would be favorable 
to the convicted person.’”
225
 After relying on the standard set forth in 
Crumpton, the court distinguished Crumpton factually from Tovar.
226
 
The court found that in Crumpton, the perpetrator’s identity was at issue, 
and therefore, exculpatory DNA results would affect the likelihood of 
innocence.
227
 On the other hand, in a defense of consent or excuse, as 
Tovar had raised, an exculpatory DNA result would not exclude Tovar 
as the perpetrator, but only shed light on the victim’s credibility.
228
 
Therefore, the DNA evidence would “add little” to determining Tovar’s 




These two cases illustrate how lower courts are beginning to apply 
Crumpton. Interestingly, Tovar involved a single-perpetrator where the 
court applied a favorable presumption but still denied the motion for 
post-conviction DNA testing,
230
 a scenario that Justice Stephens 
dissenting in Crumpton expressed concern could not happen when 
applying the favorable presumption.
231
 However, unlike in Crumpton, in 
both Allen and Tovar the identity of the perpetrator was not the primary 
issue.
232
 Therefore, although the impact of Crumpton on post-conviction 
                                                     
222. Id. 
223. Id.  
224. Id.  
225. Id. at *2 (citing State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 255, 332 P.3d 448, 449 (2014)). 




230. Id. at *1. 
231. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 268, 332 P.3d 448, 455 (2014) (Stephens, J., 
dissenting). 
232. Id. at 256–57, 332 P.3d at 450 (majority opinion) (noting that Crumpton admitted to being in 
the victim’s house but denied hitting or raping her); State v. Allen, No. 31578-9-III, 2014 WL 
5089235, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2014) (noting the victims knew Allen and would not 
misidentify him); State v. Tovar, 2015 WL 540903, at *3 (noting Tovar’s defense was consent or 
excuse). 
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DNA testing motions is still unclear, these cases demonstrate a 
willingness in the courts to take into consideration the entire body of 
evidence before determining whether to permit testing rather than letting 
the favorable presumption create a “revolving door.”
233
 As time passes, 
courts will likely further interpret the favorable presumption set forth in 
Crumpton and there will be more evidence of its successes and failures. 
V. READING A FAVORABLE PRESUMPTION INTO RCW 
10.73.170 ALIGNS WITH THE APPROACHES OF OTHER 
STATES, LEGISLATIVE GOALS OF JUSTICE, AND 
SOCIETY’S DESIRE TO EXONERATE THE INNOCENT 
This Part will consider the prudence of the Court’s favorable 
presumption. First, this Part will compare Crumpton’s requirement of a 
favorable presumption to the approaches of post-conviction DNA testing 
in other states. Then, the alignment of the favorable presumption with 
both federal and state legislative goals of justice will be examined. 
Finally, this Part will argue that the favorable presumption properly 
furthers policy goals of avoiding incarcerating the innocent, particularly 
because the fear of courts being overburdened by requests for DNA 
testing has not yet played out in Washington courts. 
A. A Favorable Presumption Is Consistent with the Statutes of Other 
States 
Many states have avoided the question the Washington State Supreme 
Court faced in Crumpton because their statutes explicitly state that 
evaluation of post-conviction DNA testing motions should presume 
“exculpatory results.”
234
 Texas’s statute, for example, requires DNA 
testing if the court finds “the person would not have been convicted if 
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”
235
 Texas 
appellate courts have explained the task under the statute is not to 
determine the likelihood of a favorable DNA result; rather, the statute 
demands the court “assume that the results of the DNA testing would 
                                                     
233. See Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 268, 332 P.3d at 455 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (“The effect 
[of the favorable presumption], at least in single perpetrator rape cases, is to create a revolving door 
for individuals already convicted beyond a reasonable doubt to postpone finality and burden the 
system with requests for DNA testing solely on the ground that new DNA technology now exists.”).  
234. Brooks & Simpson, supra note 34, at 81. 
235. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(emphasis added).  
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prove favorable to appellant.”
236
 Hawaii’s statute requires a court to 
order DNA testing if it finds “[a] reasonable probability exists that the 
defendant would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory 
results had been obtained through DNA analysis, even if the defendant 
later pled guilty or no contest.”
237
 The model post-conviction DNA 
testing statute promulgated by the Innocence Project also contains 
explicit favorable presumption language.
238
 
In 2013, Oklahoma became the final state to pass a law permitting 
post-conviction DNA testing.
239
 The text of Oklahoma’s statute 
explicitly requires that reviewing judges apply a favorable presumption 
to DNA testing results.
240
 The statute reads: “A court shall order DNA 
testing only if the court finds . . . [a] reasonable probability that the 
petitioner would not have been convicted if favorable results had been 
obtained through DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution.”
241
 
Oklahoma promulgated the statute after recognizing that it was the 
only state without access to post-conviction DNA testing.
242
 The 
Oklahoma Justice Commission—the group that prompted the drafting of 
the legislation
243
—detailed the shortcomings of laws in other states it 
sought to overcome.
244
 The Commission recognized that the laws of 
many other states presented insurmountable hurdles to the petitioner, 
placing the burden on the defense to “effectively solve the crime and 
prove that the DNA evidence promises to implicate another 
individual.”
245
 The Commission recommended a “reasonable standard” 
to establish proof of innocence.
246
 The proposed legislation required a 
                                                     
236. In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). 
237. HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-123(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
238. INNOCENCE PROJECT, MODEL LEGISLATION: AN ACT CONCERNING ACCESS TO POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING 3 (2012), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-
innocent/improve-the-law/Access_to_Post_Conviction_DNA_Testing_Model_Bill.pdf (“A 
reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or would have received a 
lesser sentence if favorable results had been obtained through DNA testing at the time of the 
original prosecution.” (emphasis added)). 
239. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373.4(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); see 
OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION 24 (2013) (noting that 
Oklahoma was the last state in the United States to not have a post-conviction DNA testing law). 
240. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373.4(A)(1). 
241. Id. (emphasis added). 
242. OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 239, at 24. 
243. Press Release, Okla. Bar Ass’n, Oklahoma Justice Commission Issues Final Report, 
Adjourns (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.okbar.org/news/Recent/2013/DNATesting.aspx. 
244. OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 239, at 24. 
245. Id. 
246. Id.  
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finding that there is “a reasonable probability that the petitioner would 
not have been convicted if favorable results had been obtained through 
DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution.”
247
 The legislature 
ultimately adopted the Commission’s proposed language.
248
 Thus, 
Oklahoma’s solution to the insurmountable hurdles petitioners faced in 
other states was to include an explicit favorable presumption in its 
statute. 
Since the 2013 enactment of the Oklahoma post-conviction DNA 
testing statute two appellate opinions have addressed it.
249
 In State ex rel. 
Smith v. Neuwirth,
250
 an appellate court reversed a lower court’s grant of 
post-conviction DNA testing on procedural grounds.
251
 The lower court 
judge, in granting the motion for post-conviction DNA testing, reasoned: 
In looking at the statute itself . . . a reasonable probability the 
petitioner would not have been convicted if favorable results had 
been obtained . . . . I don’t understand how you could ever deny 
that, if you have favorable results, they are such that they show 
exculpatory evidence . . . . I don’t believe under the statute I 
have any other decision other than to allow it.
252
 
In reversing this decision, the appellate court found that the trial court 
abused its discretion by finding a reasonable probability that favorable 
DNA results would have prevented the conviction.
253
 The court reversed 
because the petitioner failed to include the statutorily required affidavit 
in his motion requesting DNA testing.
254
 Despite its reversal, the 
appellate court focused only on the procedural shortcoming—the 
missing affidavit—and did not criticize the commentary of the lower 
court judge that the favorable presumption generally requires the 
granting of post-conviction DNA testing.
255
 
Other states—such as Georgia and Iowa, as well as the District of 
                                                     
247. Id. at 83. 
248. Compare id. (“[A] reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted 
if favorable results had been obtained through DNA testing at the time of the original 
prosecution.”), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373.4(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st 
Reg. Sess.) (adopting the exact same language).  
249. State ex rel. Smith v. Neuwirth, 337 P.3d 763 (Okla. 2014) (explored in detail below); 
Watson v. State, 343 P.3d 1282, 1283 (Okla. 2015) (holding the petitioner was procedurally barred 
from filing a second motion for post-conviction DNA testing). 
250. 337 P.3d 763 (Okla. 2014). 
251. Id. at 764. 
252. Id.  
253. Id. at 766. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 766–67. 
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Columbia—have post-conviction DNA testing statutes that contain 
ambiguous “reasonable probability” language and no explicit favorable 
presumption.
256
 For example, the California Penal Code requires, among 
other things, that the petitioner “[e]xplain, in light of all the evidence, 
how the requested DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that 
the convicted person’s verdict or sentence would be more favorable if 




Scholars have criticized the California statute because its ambiguous 
standard could lead to frustration of the statute’s purpose:
 258
 
The only way the statute can be interpreted without frustrating 
its purpose is to take a “one-step” approach. The court should 
determine whether the result of a favorable DNA test could 
produce evidence that, even when considering all the evidence 
produced at trial, creates a reasonable probability the convicted 
person’s verdict or sentence would have been more favorable if 
the results of the DNA testing had been available at the time of 
trial. If the court fails to make the presumption of a favorable 
DNA testing result, the statute can never achieve its purpose.
259
 
The scholars argue post-conviction DNA statutes that purport to have the 
purpose of ensuring justice must be read with a favorable 
presumption.
260
 Although the “reasonable probability” language may be 
ambiguous, the Supreme Court of California later read a favorable 
presumption into the statute.
261
 Twice in that opinion, the Court stated 




It is important to note that President Bush did not sign the Innocence 
Protection Act into law until 2004.
263
 Many of the developments in state 
law allowing for post-conviction DNA testing have occurred—or 
advanced—after the passage of the federal statute. For example, the 
Innocence Protection Act influenced the Washington State post-
                                                     
256. Brooks & Simpson, supra note 34, at 812. 
257. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(d)(1)(D) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
258. Brooks & Simpson, supra note 34, at 812 (emphasis in original). 
259. Id. 
260. Id.  
261. Richardson v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1199, 1201 (Cal. 2008). Although the decision pre-
dates the most recent 2015 version of the statute, the relevant language in the new version remains 
unchanged. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(c)(1)(B) (2005).  
262. Richardson, 183 P.3d at 1203, 1205–06. 
263. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2012). 
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conviction DNA statute, as seen in its legislative history.
264
 Given 
Washington and California’s eventual reading of a favorable 
presumption into their statutes, and the many statutes that explicitly have 
a favorable presumption, post-conviction DNA law may be in a state of 
transition to expand access to justice.
265
 Therefore, if the expansion of 
access to justice is occurring in other states, the majority’s favorable 
presumption in Crumpton is consistent with that legal trend. 
B. A Favorable Presumption Is Consistent with the Legislative Goals 
of Justice 
Beyond the statutory text explored above, Crumpton’s favorable 
presumption is consistent with the overarching legislative goals of 
justice as articulated by both the federal and Washington State 
legislatures. Congress passed the Innocence Protection Act with an 
understanding that the desired path to justice was a complicated one.
266
 
Opening the hearing before the United States Senate on post-conviction 
DNA testing in 2000, Senator Orrin Hatch made the following remarks: 
No one here today will quarrel with the assertion that post-
conviction DNA testing should be made available when it serves 
the ends of justice. Reaching agreement on a practical definition 
for justice, however, is a difficult and different matter. After all, 
justice does mean different things to different people. . . . [W]e 
have an obligation to balance the adequacy of procedural 
protections afforded to defendants against the need for integrity 
and finality in State and Federal courts. It is my hope that in 
holding this hearing, we can take a first step toward reaching 
consensus on how best to strike this balance in the area of post-




As the hearing continued, the various witnesses and senators debated the 
appropriate standard necessary to carry out their goals of justice, 
particularly if the testing should presume an exculpatory result.
268
 In the 
                                                     
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (recognizing the need to conform to 
the Justice for All Act in order to obtain federal funding for post-conviction DNA testing).  
265. See CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES 3–6 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed. 2014) (summarizing 
the beginning, and continuing momentum, of the “innocence revolution”). 
266. See Post-Conviction DNA Testing: When Is Justice Served?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (2000). 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 98. (“[T]he court in ordering DNA testing has to determine that testing would produce 
non-cumulative exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim.” (statement of Sen. Leahy)); cf. id. at 
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end, the Innocence Protection Act was passed with the requirement that 
the proposed DNA testing may produce new material evidence that 
would “raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did not commit 
the offense,”
269
 rather than an explicit presumption of an exculpatory 
result. 
This complex balance between the rights of convicted persons and 
societal interests in finality continued to permeate the debate on post-
conviction DNA testing after the passage of the Innocence Protection 
Act. Years later, the Washington legislature grappled with this balance 
as it formulated RCW 10.73.170.
270
 Washington weighed the need to 
“ensure that a process remains in place for cases where DNA tests could 
provide evidence of a person’s innocence” against the desire to minimize 
the number of requests by “keeping the high ‘proof of innocence’ 
standard in the bill.”
271
 Although the legislature weighed both 
considerations of justice, ultimately the intent was to maintain the high 
proof of innocence standard in order to limit testing to cases where 
credible DNA testing “could benefit an innocent person.”
272
 The Court 
continues to describe this standard as “onerous.”
273
 
It is difficult to reconcile the legislative intent to maintain an onerous 
standard for post-conviction DNA testing with the favorable 
presumption the Court reads into RCW 10.73.170. There is, of course, 
an argument that if the legislature intended for there to be a favorable 
presumption, they would have written it into the statute as many other 
states had done. The State, in its response brief filed with the Court for 
Crumpton, even argued the policy statements being raised had been 
“plainly considered and rejected by the Legislature when it enacted the 
statute.”
274
 However persuasive this reliance on purported legislative 
intent may be, its weight in the ultimate evaluation of Crumpton’s 
favorable presumption must be balanced against the aforementioned 
overarching legislative goals of justice that are furthered by the 
favorable presumption. 
                                                     
107 (“[R]equiring granting of DNA typing so long as that evidence is . . . relevant and 
exculpatory[,] . . . . that is a standard that is of some difficulty to me” (statement of George Clarke)). 
269. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B) (2012). 
270. H.R. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 261, 332 P.3d 448, 452 (2014) (citing State v. Riofta, 
166 Wash. 2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467, 472 (2009)). 
274. Brief for Respondent at 18, State v. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. 408, 389 P.3d 766 (2012) 
(No. 42173-9-II). 
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C. A Favorable Presumption Advances Society’s Desire to Avoid 
Incarcerating the Innocent and Will Not Likely Overburden the 
Courts  
The number of exonerations that have occurred across the nation is 
astonishing,
275
 and the litigation resulting from post-conviction DNA 
testing motions has been sparse.
276
 One reason for this, cited by the 
National Institute of Justice, is that often the State will simply consent to 
a petitioner’s request for post-conviction DNA testing, obviating the 
need for further litigation.
277
 In fact, the guidelines promulgated by the 
National Institute of Justice state a prosecutor should consent to testing 
in many cases.
278
 “For example, when a rape case turned solely, or in 
large part, on eyewitness testimony, where serology at the time was 
inconclusive or not highly discriminating, and newer, more 
discriminating tests are now available, the prosecutor should order DNA 
testing.”
279
 Therefore, the need to avoid over-burdening the judicial 
system would thus far appear not to be a concern—or at least, not 
enough of a concern to override the interest in exonerating innocent 
prisoners. 
The myth of over-burdened courts due to post-conviction DNA 
testing has also not come to fruition in Washington. According to the 
Office of Public Defense, eighteen people have filed for relief under 
RCW 10.73.170 since its enactment in 2005.
280
 In addition, according to 
the Innocence Network’s amicus brief in Crumpton, “only three of the 
state crime lab’s 967 backlogged DNA cases were the result of an RCW 
10.73.170 petition.”
281
 Although these numbers do not fully represent 
the pressure put on Washington courts and labs, they can help put the 
burden into perspective. However, as Justice Stephens argues in her 
dissent,
282
 the burdens on the system thus far have not taken into account 
                                                     
275. As of March 8, 2015, there have been 1560 total—DNA and non-DNA—exonerations 
across the United States. The National Registry of Exonerations, supra note 40. 
276. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 158. 
277. Id. 
278. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 40. 
279. Id. 
280. Memorandum from Wash. State Office of Pub. Def. (received Jan. 27, 2015) (noting that 
motions are not required to be filed with the Office of Public Defense). Number is calculated using 
motions filed with the Office of Public Defense after the March 9, 2015 enactment date. See WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014). 
281. Amicus Curiae Brief of Innocence Network in Support of Petition for Review at 7–8, State 
v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014) (No. 88336–0). 
282. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 271, 332 P.3d at 457.  
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the favorable presumption found by the Court. Therefore, even if the 
burden on the system does not outweigh the benefit of justice for the 
wrongfully convicted now, the favorable presumption may open the door 
for such a burden. However, any such argument at this point would be 




Additionally, as discussed previously in the context of the California 
Penal Code, the Court’s reading of a favorable presumption into the 
statute is consistent with cases interpreting statutes in other states with 
similar “reasonable likelihood” language.
284
 As articulated by the 
National Institute of Justice: 
The “reasonable likelihood” prong ensures that the evidence to 
be tested has probative value. Because it is impossible to know 
the outcome of DNA testing in advance of actual testing, this 
inquiry requires the court to presume favorable test results and 
determine the significance of those favorable test results – that 
is, whether it is ‘reasonable likely’ that favorable test results 
would be probative enough to establish the applicant’s 
innocence. The “reasonable probability” prong requires the court 
to consider the probative value of favorable test results on the 
case – not whether it thinks it is likely, as a matter of fact, that 
the applicant is actually innocent.
285
 
The Court’s holding in Crumpton is consistent with this analysis. 
Although Justice Stephens’s well-reasoned dissent asserts many 
complex policy considerations against reading a favorable presumption 
into RCW 10.73.170, it is not clear that the concerns addressed by those 
policy arguments have come to fruition. Creating a “revolving door” for 
single perpetrator cases may conflict with the intent of the legislature, 
but absent evidence of the evils the onerous standard was meant to 
protect against, the countervailing interest in justice for the wrongfully 
convicted weighs more heavily. 
CONCLUSION 
Post-conviction DNA testing is a valuable tool in ensuring the most 
just outcomes in Washington’s criminal justice system. Given the 
astonishing number of exonerations and the apparent myth of over-
                                                     
283. See supra notes 208–30. 
284. Supra notes 257–62262. 
285. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 159 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Peterson, 
836 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J. 2003); State v. DeMarco, 904 A.2d 797, 804 (N.J. 2006)). 
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burdened courts, expanding access to post-conviction DNA testing is a 
desirable result. Although the legislature intended to maintain an 
onerous standard for access to post-conviction DNA testing, the 
Washington State Supreme Court properly found the current legal and 
social landscapes supported reading a favorable presumption into RCW 
10.73.170. Evaluating motions for post-conviction DNA testing with a 
presumption the DNA evidence requested would be favorable to the 
petitioner is also consistent with the approaches of many other states. 
Although federal law has not yet adopted the explicit favorable 
presumption, Washington can consider itself among the trailblazers in 
expanding access to justice through post-conviction DNA testing. 
